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Satelliittipaikannus on yleistynyt nopeasti sotilaskäytöstä aivan jokapäiväiseksi avuksi autoilusta lasten 
vahtimiseen. Vaikka uuden teknologian käyttö on yleistynyt voimakkaasti, ei sen sisältämiin vaaroihin ole 
paneuduttu riittävästi. Paikannusta käytetään yleisesti tuottavuuden ja turvallisuuden parantamiseen, 
mutta väärinkäytettynä paikannus tarjoaa ennemminkin työkaluja rikollisille. Tämän vuoksi vuoden 2008 
lopussa aloitettiin SATERISK-projekti.  
 
 SATERISK-projektin tarkoituksena on selvittää satelliittipaikannuksen käyttöön liittyviä riskejä, sekä 
suunnitella ja toteuttaa vastatoimia niihin. Osaltaan projekti liittyy eurooppalaisen GALILEO-projektin 
mahdollistamiin muutoksiin, vaikka pääpaino onkin paikannuslaitteissa sekä taustajärjestelmissä.  
 
Projektin ensimmäinen vaihe tuotti projektisuunnitelman mukaisesti riskianalyysin ja tämä päättötyö on 
luonnollinen jatko sille. Tässä työssä on paneuduttu esittelemään SATERISK-projektiin liittyviä 
konferenssitöitä, joissa kirjoittaja on ollut osallisena. Lähestymistapa on ollut pitkälti tekninen, sillä 
kirjoittajan taustasta johtuen esimerkiksi lakiosuus on erittäin rajoitettu.  
 
 
Päättötyön ensimmäinen julkaisu liittyy signaalinhäirintään sekä sen vastatoimiin. Kaikki häirintä ei 
luonnollisesti ole tahallista, vaan esimerkiksi maasto ja tunnelit voivat aiheuttaa katkoksia. Näistä 
tilanteista toipuminen, sekä sopivat vastatoimenpiteet ovat erittäin tärkeitä mm. arvokuljetuksissa.  
 
Toisessa ja kolmannessa julkaisussa on keskitytty organisaation välisen tiedonkulun haasteisiin 
paikannettaessa. Kyseinen ongelma liittyy eritoten kansainväliseen viranomaisyhteistyöhön, mutta myös 
useammassa maassa toimivat logistiikkayhtiöt ovat vastaavan haasteet edessä.  
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Within last two decades, popularity of the satellite-based navigation has boomed from military application 
to common aid in driving and safety equipment for children. People have become even too dependent of 
technical aid while risk of their usage is too often forgotten. Especially this is serious risk in companies 
and public sector, where positioning and tracking is used to improve security and productivity. To avoid 
these problems SATERISK-project was found.  
 
Goal for the project is to search risks about satellite-based navigation and also find solutions for them. 
Project has small part in GALILEO project development, while main part of the project focuses on tracking 
devices and backend software.  
 
 
The requirements analysis was the first phase of SATERISK-project and this thesis is natural continuum for 
it. This thesis focuses to present those publications done for the SATERISK-project, where thesis writer 
have had a part. Personal approach for the task is mainly technical due to writer’s background and 
therefore for example juridical part is really limited. 
 
First publication in the thesis is about signal interference and countermeasures for them. All interference 
is not intentional, but for example terrain and road tunnels may cause signal loss. Therefore recovery and 
countermeasures for these situations should be considered beforehand. It is absolutely important to know, 
if the interference is manmade or unintentional, especially in transportation of valuable goods.  
 
Second and third publications were about time critical data communication between multinational 
organizations. This problem is common in law enforcement environment. Criminals are working more 
often abroad due the European integration, but law enforcement authorities do not have common 
protocols and procedures, how to pass information between each other. Especially machine to machine 
(M2M) communication is not researched yet.  
 
 
Key words: Requirement analysis, Galileo, GPS, Risk, GIS, Tracking, SATERISK 
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PREFACE 
 
The thesis work is going to present three publications that were made as a part of the 
SATERISK-project. It also gives a picture about satellite-based navigation and tracking 
applications. I was fortunate to get this possibility to work along this project. In the project, I 
was able to use my previous knowledge about satellite-based navigation and I also gained 
huge amount of information about the topic. It gave me many new points of view to the wide 
area of satellite-based navigation and it will certainly help me in the future in my work and 
also in my hobbies.  
 
Satellite-based navigation is also rapidly developing topic and different uses for navigation 
are invented nearly daily basis. Especially GPS-based road toll applications are getting more 
popular (Iltalehti 2010). It has been a great opportunity to do an interesting work and study 
about everyday technologies for tomorrow.  
 
The work has been performed under guidance of Dr. Jyri Rajamäki, who also works as a part 
of the SATERISK project. His spirit, skill to encourage and new ideas have been great help for 
the project and also for my thesis work. I feel lucky to have such a professional as a tutor and 
coworker. I am also very grateful for him about offering me this possibility to have a part in 
this marvelous project. 
 
I would like to thank the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation, TEKES, about 
providing funding for SATERISK-project. Without this, the entire project would be cancelled 
or reduced. The project has so far been interesting and motivating to learn more about 
satellite-based tracking. My special thanks to all SATERISK-team for co-operation. Your 
different background and many ideas have been so fruitful and your spirit has kicked me 
forward in my work. SATERISK-project also made it possible to participate to the conferences 
by providing funding for these trips. My special thanks for this.  
 
I would also like to LAUREAs teachers and personnel. Your professional attitude and skills 
have provided really good learning environment. Also, all other co-authors of the publications 
have my special gratitude.  
 
I also like to thank my fellow students to provide workgroups where they provided their 
experiences from different fields of ICT sector. Especially I like to thank my colleague and 
fellow student Jouni Viitanen, who had great contribution for my decision to apply Laurea 
University of Applied Sciences. Mr. Viitanen also played essential part when inventing 
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SATERISK-project and finding proper funding for it. Without him, I wouldn’t be able to do this 
interesting thesis.  
 
Also my family, friends and relatives deserve my gratitude for their support not only during 
good days, but also when things were not going that smoothly. Last but not least I would like 
to thank my employer for flexibility and giving me possibility to study.  
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LIST OF PUBLICATIONS      
This thesis consists of an introduction and the following three publications, which are 
preferred by [P1]-[P3] in the text:  
 
[P1] M. Happonen, J. Viitanen, P. Kokkonen, J. Ojala & J. Rajamäki, “Jamming detection in 
the future navigation and tracking systems”, In proceedings of the 16th Saint Petersburg 
International Conference of Integrated Navigation Systems, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 2009. 
ISBN 978-5-900780-69-6, pp. 314-317 
 
[P2] J. Viitanen, M. Happonen, P. Patama & J. Rajamäki, “International and 
transorganizational information flow of tracking data”, in proceedings of the 8th WSEAS 
International Conference on Information Security and Privacy (ISP ’09), Puerto de la Cruz, 
Tenerife, Spain, December 2009. ISBN 978-960-474-143-4, pp. 111-115 
 
[P3] J. Viitanen, M. Happonen, P. Patama & J. Rajamäki, “Near border Procedures for 
Tracking Information”, WSEAS TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, Issue 3, Volume 9, March 2010. 
ISSN 1109-2777, pp. 223-232 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS & SYMBOLS 
 
A-GPS = Assisted GPS, satellite-based positioning method aided by mobile networks 
3G = common name for third generation mobile networks  
CII = critical information infrastructure 
CIIP = critical information infrastructure protection 
DSA = Designated Security Authority 
EGNOS = European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service 
EU = European Union 
Europol = European Law Enforcement Organization.  
FICORA = Finnish Communication Regulatory Authority 
Frontex = European Union’s agency for external border security. 
GALILEO = Joint European satellite-based navigation system. Due to major delays it is 
currently only in early test phase. Planned to be fully operational around 2013 (ESA – 
Navigation - The future – Galileo 2009).  
GIS = Geographical Information System  
GLONASS = (GLObalnaja NAvigatsionnaja Sputnikovaja Sistema). Russian satellite-based based 
navigation system. Currently being reinstalled and should be fully operational in near future. 
GNSS= Global Navigation Satellite System 
GPS=Global Positioning system. Satellite-based global positioning system operated by Navstar  
GPRS = 3rd generation mobile network 
GSM = 2nd generation mobile network 
IGD= Information Gathering Device 
IRNSS = Indian Regional Navigational Satellite System 
LEA = Law Enforcement Authority. Common name for law enforcement authorities, including 
for example: police, customs and border guard. 
M2M= Machine to Machine. Data gathering method were humans are not directly involved. 
MIL-STD= NATO based military standard 
NASA = National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NMEA = (National Marine Electronics Association) Organization that created popularly used 
positioning protocol, also named NMEA.  
NCSA = National Communication Authority 
NSA = National Security Authority 
SATERISK = Joint project to detect and counter SATEllite-based positioning RISKs. Main 
participants are LAUREA University of Applies Sciences and University of Lapland. [KTS.] 
TCP/IP = Transfer control protocol/Internet Protocol  
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TEKES = the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation. Tekes is the main public 
funding organization for research, development and innovation in Finland. Tekes provides 
funding for SATERISK-project. 
TETRA = (Terrestrial Trunked Radio) Professional Mobile radio, widely used by law 
enforcement 
VPN = (Virtual Private Network) Encryption device to the TCP/IP networks. 
WAN = Wide Area Network 
WLAN = Wireless TCP/IP Network 
WSEAS = World Scientific and Engineering Academy and Society 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Within last decade, satellite-based navigation has become available tool for every consumer. 
Satellite-based navigation has been integrated to the boats, airplanes, luxury cars and now 
even to the mobile phones. Still, risks and misuse of satellite-based navigation have been 
almost forgotten. Therefore SATERISK project was found. This paper is a part of a SATERISK-
project and basically continuum to MBA Jouni Viitanen’s thesis work “requirement analysis of 
the SATERISK-project” (Viitanen 2009).  
 
This paper is going to summarize and represent 3 publications where the publisher has taken 
a part. It is going to present some basics about satellite-based navigation and also some 
basics about tracking applications. Main task for the thesis work is to point out essential and 
too often forgotten risks in satellite-based navigation and tracking applications. The first 
publication is researching issues about tracking interference, while second focuses to 
problems on multiorganizational tracking information flows.  The third publication is based to 
the second one. However, it is wider and published in WSEAS TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, 
Issue 3, Volume 9, March 2010.  
 
SATERISK-project has started as a special work relating to Jouni Viitanens and Jussi Ojalas 
studies. It was shortly found to be exciting and needed research topic and therefore was 
introduced also to the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation TEKES. After 
negotiations, TEKES gave part of the funding for SATERISK. Jouni Viitanen also made his thesis 
work about the topic and he has taken part to the publications. The thesis work proved need 
for further examination about the topic.  
 
Main goal for the thesis was to create more information to the SATERISK-project. My personal 
effort to the project was to get more familiar with signal interference and also create 
possible risk scenarios and countermeasures for them. This topic was presented at conference 
held in St. Petersburg.  Also the second publication had same kind of approach, but this time 
topic was tracking related multiorganizational information flow.  Also this publication was 
presented in conference, this time held in Puerto de la Cruz, Spain.  
 
The most important task for this paper is to present these works done for the SATERISK 
project, where writer have had a part. Mainly these works are conference papers and 
presentations, but also proposed journal is also included. Main goal for these papers and 
presentations were to get publicity for a project and also get new approach and feedback 
from the audience.  
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As a result for the research, more information was gathered for the SATERISK-project. Also 
new risk scenarios were created and some possible solutions were found. Also need for 
international co-operation came essential. The thesis work will point out need for further 
research about the topic. The publications will point out lack of co-operation between law 
enforcement authorities.  
 
In this thesis work, scope of the study is presented first. After that, general information about 
navigation, SATERISK and problems are presented. Third major topic is short presentation of 
the publications and discussion about results and further studies.  
 
2  SCOPE AND STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
 
2.1 Scope, objectives and methods 
  
Objective of the study was to find possible risk scenarios and bottlenecks in satellite-based 
tracking. The work was done under SATERISK-project and due to personal background, 
approach is mainly technical. The scope of the study was to find new approach and points of 
view to the topic of general interest. Although the work was mainly theoretical, it is based to 
practical experience and to real scenarios. Also the results of the study should be usable in 
the field of tracking in the future. Main questions this work concentrates to answer are: 
- Are electronic countermeasures and other similar interference providing risks to 
the tracking and how there could be avoided 
- What are the main issues in international or in multiorganizational tracking 
applications 
- What steps are required to create commonly used doctrines in tracking 
 
Main goal of the study is to gain knowledge to the project and help to find possible solutions 
to everyday tracking applications.   
 
Publication [P1] was made using design research method. Goal for the publication was to 
create guidelines for better tracking devices with error recovery and jamming detection. Also 
new operational procedures were considered in the publication.  
 
Publications [P2] and [P3] were done using constructive research method. Goal for the papers 
were to point out the problems and to find possible solutions for multiorganizational tracking.  
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2.2 Structure and schedule  
 
Saterisk project were founded on the second half of the year 2008 (Viitanen 2009). Personal 
studies about thesis work started in the beginning of year 2009, although in the beginning, 
development was relatively slow. Main part of the work in SATERISK project have been data 
gathering, creating contact and participant networks and finishing requirement analysis 
(Viitanen 2009). SATERISK-project has so far provided couple of conference papers, where I 
have been one of the writers. Conference papers and participations are introduced more 
thoroughly in chapter 2.3. As a part of the thesis work, I have taken part to conferences and 
gathered information during year 2009.  
 
2.3 Contribution of the Author:  
 
Publication [P1] is based on the analysis of the risks of intentional and unintentional 
countermeasures for tracking applications. The presentation based to the publication was 
given in 16th Saint Petersburg International conference on integrated navigation systems. The 
author was part of the research group as a student and author’s contribution to the 
publication is approximately 65%. Author was sole presenter of the paper in conference.  
 
Publication [P2] were written for and presented in the 8th WSEAS international conference on 
Information Security and Privacy (ISP `09), in Puerto de La Cruz, Spain. The author was part 
of the research group as a student and author’s contribution to the publication is 
approximately 35%. Author was companied with a teacher and fellow researcher in the 
conference. 
 
Publication [P3] was written to a journal, relating to 8th WSEAS conference. The publication 
was published in WSEAS Transactions on Systems, Issue 3, Volume 9, March 2010 (ISSN 1109-
2777).  The author was part of the research group as a student and researcher. The author’s 
contribution to the publication is approximately 40%.  
 
The co-authors have seen these descriptions of contributions, and agree with the author. 
 
3  NAVIGATION 
 
Navigation has always been a great issue for human kind. Still, less than fifty years ago, first 
satellite-based navigation systems have been developed. Also the most common satellite-
based navigation system (GPS), were found on the seventies (Standford University – News 
release, 1995).  In the beginning satellite-based navigation and tracking were reserved for 
military applications and civil use were restricted. In earlier days, GPS satellite signal was 
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also disturbed in civil applications to reduce accuracy to about 100 meters. This, although 
were removed shortly after end of the cold war in 1993 (Standford University – News release, 
1995). 
 
Within last two decades satellite-based navigation has become every day tool also in civil 
world. Time period is relatively short and therefore our dependency of it is quite impressing. 
Aviation, maritime transport and nowadays even everyday car ride is either based or aided by 
satellite-based navigation.  
 
Another common civil use for satellite-based navigation is to use it as a tracking aid. 
Nowadays, tracking is used in logistic companies and navigation is an everyday tool for every 
consumer, but are we already even too dependent about technical aids. When parents are 
using tracking devices to protect their children privacy is always compromised. And is it 
possible to use tracking devices against the targets? Then, protection aid would become a 
threat instead.  
 
Although in many applications satellite-based navigation is only method to do positioning, in 
more critical applications positioning is secured with more reliable method. For example in 
aviation, radio positioning is still commonly used method and excluding some exceptions 
always an alternative method.  
 
4  POSITIONING 
 
Satellite-based navigation is based to a comparison of at least four (or in some cases three, 
when altitude information is lost) satellites. Satellites have a specific clock in them and 
therefore distances between tracking unit and satellite is computed from the difference of 
satellite times. Also additional information is sent, like position of the satellite and 
ephemerides. Principle of satellite-based navigation is presented on figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Satellite-based tracking system 
 
Satellite-based tracking systems may wary, but the principle remains the same, whether it is 
about GPS, GLONASS, GALILEO or similar. The accuracy of the satellite systems depends 
about accuracy of the clock, possible bouncing signal, distance from the satellite and 
weather. To reduce false positions necessary amount of the satellites are needed. Currently 
24 GPS satellites are on orbit and in use, while four satellites are as spare ones (Garmin – 
What is GPS).  
 
5  RISKS 
 
The most common risk for satellite-based navigation and tracking is lack of the satellite 
signal. All the interference is not intentional, but caused by natural reasons. Some 
interference still is manmade. Nowadays, there have been documented cases where criminals 
have used signal interference devices. In the future, when GPS based road tolls probably 
come more common (Findarticles – technology, 2008), also willingness to interrupt satellite 
signal to avoid taxes increases.  
 
Necessary countermeasures for interference need to be found. Because interfering device is 
almost impossible to find, the active countermeasures should be done in tracking devices. In 
Finland controlling radio frequencies belongs to Finnish Communications Regulatory 
Authority, FICORA, but naturally their ways to prevent signal interference is really limited. So 
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therefore, police is the only authority to have even slightest possibility to catch anybody from 
using such a device.  
 
6 SATERISK-PROJECT 
 
Saterisk project started on late 2008 as on special student work, namely done by students 
Jouni Viitanen and Jussi Ojala. Shortly after presenting work to the teachers, value and idea 
of the paper was noticed and decision to upgrade work to multiorganizational project was 
made.  Decision was made to create student led research project. After negotiations with the 
Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation (TEKES), University of Lapland, and 
companies from the private sector, SATERISK-project was found.  SATERISK-project sectors 
are presented in figure 2.  
National legislation
EU-legislation
EU- directives and 
norms
Bilateral agreements 
between states
International 
agreements
Satellite systems
GPS
Galileo
Glonass
Network operators GPS- and Galileo 
receiver 
manufacturer
IGD ( Information
Gathering Devices )
Mapping software
User segment
PROJECT  SECTORS
Figure 2. SATERISK project sectors 
 
 
SATERISK project was found to search possible risk scenarios in satellite-based navigation and 
tracking applications.  Within last decade usage of satellite-based tracking application have 
boomed, but only little research about risks and setbacks are done. Saterisk project have 
legislation part, done by University of Lapland. University of Lapland also has close contact 
with Russian counterpart and therefore comparison between legislation is easily done.  
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Technical part of the project is coordinated by Laurea University of Applied Sciences and 
future scenarios are built by information from private sector, too.  
 
7 SUMMARY OF PUBLICATIONS   
 
7.1 Jamming detection in the future navigation and tracking systems  
 
This publication examines the possible risks and counter measures for intentional and 
unintentional signal interference. Also possibility to interrupt signal and use it criminally 
against the target is considered in this publication. Misuse of the tracking signal is one key 
factor in SATERISK and therefore is should not be skipped.  
 
Navigation and tracking is used to decrease risks especially in logistics and to optimize work 
flow, but does it always work that way? Military uses of positioning have always been heavily 
protected, but in civil applications security issues and possibility for signal interference are 
too often ignored. While usage of navigation and tracking applications has increased, risk for 
misuse of position information has increased as well.  
 
Tracking devices can be interfered in several ways and each of them has their own 
countermeasures. When satellite navigation is interrupted, alternative positioning methods, 
like mobile networks base station, should be used. False satellites (so called pseudolites) 
should be ignored. When transmitting signal of tracking device is blocked, should device use 
alternative transmission method, if available? If no other transmission method is available, 
tracking unit should work as a logger and send positions afterwards.  
 
All the interference is not intentional. Tunnels and other manmade structures may cause 
signal interference, as well as terrain. However, in some cases this is hard to separate. In 
these cases position should be registered to the device or mapping server to avoid possible 
problems in the area in the future.   
 
Countermeasures for interference also depend about, if the target is aware of the tracking. 
For example in case of transportation of valuable goods, driver should always be alarmed first 
in case of interference. The driver is the best person to estimate, if the interference is 
caused by natural reasons (for example tunnel) or is the interference human made. The driver 
also is first to do necessary countermeasures in case of attack. After all, the most important 
countermeasure for interference is reliability in all environments (O. Pozzobon, etc, 2004).  
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7.2 International and transorganizational information flow of tracking data  
 
This publication presents problems about border crossing tracking. European integration has 
opened borders and this advantage is widely used by criminals. Therefore transmitting 
tracking and other status information between nations and different organizations should 
become every day business. Goal of the publication was to find possible bottle necks in co- 
operation between organizations and authorities. The publication also tries to find 
administrative and technical solutions to improve multi-organizational tracking solutions.  
 
In border crossing tracking, time is a key factor. After all, preventing is always more effective 
than repairing damages (EK – risk management, 1998).  However, it is also more difficult than 
crisis management. Therefore necessary doctrines and atomization is needed.  
 
Nowadays, Law Enforcement Authorities (LEA) happens to be hierarchical and therefore 
information goes through many unnecessary levels. The knowledge might be created in lower 
parts of the organization, but for spreading out, it usually must first go to the top, and only 
from there it can spread. This causes latency which in some cases might be critical. Also, 
dependency of certain employees may cause vulnerabilities to information flow.  
 
To prevent time consuming decision making process, necessary procedures and doctrines are 
needed in advance. A doctrine will give an advice, how to proceed in any given situation. 
Doctrines should be installed as doctrine libraries to the tracking system so, that no human 
effort is needed to proceed. This, however, creates some technical needs, which are the 
second part of the publication.  
 
Many of the tracking solutions are designed to work as a standalone system and therefore 
they have problems to communicate with other similar systems. Even in cases, where 
common protocol and communication channel exist, possibility to send so called metadata is 
still missing. Metadata consist essential status information about the target: model, is the 
target dangerous, armed, etc. 
 
To get proper interfaces, protocols and transmission methods, many international meetings 
and workshops are needed. Workshops should be organized by European joint organization, 
like Europol or Frontex, to get necessary value for it. Also mobile development should be 
taken care of. Therefore, SMS transmission should be used as a backup, when doing tracking 
abroad.  
 
Another technical challenge is to plan secure network topology for data transmission. All data 
transfer is encrypted and protected with virtual private network (VPN), but should tracking 
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information be also encrypted inside private network to prevent information flows? If so, 
common private key, public key encryption could be used.  
 
In the future, doctrine libraries and technical platform needs to be tested and lots of 
meetings are required. Also funding might become an issue for the project.  
 
7.3 Near border procedures for tracking information  
 
This publication is a journal, based to the publication [P2]. The publication was published in 
WSEAS journal (WSEAS – Journals, 2010). The journal approached exchange of tracking 
information more widely. Also the risks are considered more thoroughly. Also satellite-based 
tracking in general is explained more comprehensively.  
 
7.4 Discussion of the Publications  
 
In general, risks around satellite-based navigation is a huge field and therefore lots of the 
tasks are yet undone. This thesis and SATERISK-project in general covers only a little of the 
topic and therefore more research work and co-operation is required. The project needs more 
participants to provide more information. 
 
Especially the first publication shows, how the adaptability of the criminals is a challenge for 
law enforcement and logistics companies. Self learning devices are required to face 
interference and countermeasures are required to be planned beforehand. Countermeasures 
depend a lot about current case and if the driver of the tracked vehicle is aware of the 
device. 
 
More tests are required and development work on tracking devices and background system is 
essential. Also A-GPS and any other aid should be considered, although also they have same 
restrictions about jamming.   
 
The second and the third publication showed up risks about tracking solutions between 
organizations. It also brought up a problem between publicity of the academic research and 
providing tools for law enforcement agencies. It is natural, that all the used tools should not 
be published because it would give too much help for criminals to countermeasure them. On 
the other hand research work, especially when doing it as an academic project, should be 
open and under critique.  
 
International co-operation is everyday business in police work, through Europol and Interpol. 
Still, technical co-operation is really limited and should be used more often. Criminals are 
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getting more and more international, so why police operations should be limited by national 
borders in integrating Europe? 
 
8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Topic in general is really interesting and it has multiple aspects. Administrational and 
technical frames create own limitations for applications and legislation should not be 
forgotten. In fact, legislation may cause biggest paradigm also in this topic, because only one 
side obeys the rules. We need to share information, but also limit information about exact 
applications to the authorities. Balance between public studies and private or governmental 
interests may cause problems in some cases. 
 
In the future, conferences, workshops and international administrative meetings are required 
to provide possibilities to offer international level tracking applications with limited and 
acknowledged risks. Work between different sectors should be more encouraged to get 
several points of view and so create more solid and working solutions. Changes in the future 
have to be considered in beforehand. For example 4G, GALILEO and alternative positioning 
methods need research beforehand.  
 
Too much reliability to some technology should be considered as a risk. GPS signal is 
interruptible and in crisis situation probably not available. Also the future of the entire GPS 
has been questioned, GPS satellites have only certain lifetime and need to be replaced (GIS 
conference – papers, 2005). One solution for GPS dependency is forthcoming European 
positioning system, GALILEO. Timetable of the project have been postponed several times, 
but cancellation of the project doesn’t seem likely.  
 
Also other positioning methods should be considered. Base stations of the mobile phones are 
used already as a backup and also WLAN positioning is under research. For example Ekahau is 
distributing challenging indoor positioning system, which has been proved to be quite 
reliable. (Ekahau, 2010) 
 
In the future more workshops, conferences and meeting are required. Although SATERISK-
project is found to gather information about risks and countermeasures in satellite-based 
tracking and navigation, it should not try to solve every problem. When creating solutions and 
procedures, It should first be tested locally, then nationally and finally EU-level. Some backup 
from European authority, like Frontex or Europol is required, but they are more willing to 
adapt already working solutions than principles with no proof of concept.  
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In general, satellite-based tracking is used to protect valuables and to get better situation 
awareness. When using satellite-based tracking especially in multinational environment, 
standard procedures are essential to get work done. Unfortunately world is full of bad 
examples of this. For example, lack of situation awareness was also one of the main issues 
when organizing search of the remains in Air France flight 447. False information, 
multinational search force with no common procedures and not working lead caused long 
delays for operation. (Hellenberg, 2009) 
 
SATERISK project have had a good start and has got a good feedback in conferences, but lot 
of the work is still to be done and many different points of view will be found before project 
is over. We are in a right road, but have long way to go.  
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Abstract  
 
Currently, satellite navigation and tracking have become everyday routine and they are still growing 
while EU’s new satellite system Galileo will be operative in 2013. Positioning, navigation and 
tracking are used to decrease risks especially in logistics and to optimize work flow, but does it 
always work that way? Can international legislation about tracking, or lack of it, cause problems 
when doing tracking abroad? With technical aspects, are your tracking systems good enough to 
increase the security of your crown jewel or are you just giving extra hints to thieves? For 
answering these questions, the SATERISK research project was started in 2008. It aims at a 
situation where laws on positioning and tracking and the financial risks posed by their usage will 
not prevent the use of m2m tracking across state and union borders. An essential part of the project 
is to study signal interference in tracking and find ways to improve tracking devices and user habits 
in the future to avoid them. This paper focuses mainly on that topic.  
 
Index Terms—Navigation, positioning, signal interference, tracking, jamming 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
atellite navigation and tracking have become everyday routine nowadays and many security instances 
use GPS and/or GLONASS with no risk analysis. Popularity of satellite navigation still grows while 
Russian GLONASS is re-established and the EU:s new satellite tracking system Galileo will become 
operational in 2013. Also, China and India are preparing their own satellite navigation systems Beidou and 
IRNSS. 
Navigation and tracking is used to decrease risks especially in logistics and to optimize work flow, but 
does it always work that way? Military uses of positioning have always been heavily protected, but in civil 
applications security issues and possibility for signal interference are too often ignored. This is one of the 
main reasons why SATERISK project is found. At the moment SATERISK project is in a relatively early 
phase and the first main tasks are to make risk assessment and requirement specification. Preliminary risk 
assessment has supported assumption that knowledge of signal interference and counter measures for them 
are needed and therefore they are essential part of SATERISK project. Due to early phase of the SATERISK 
project, this paper is mainly theoretical and hands-on results are still forthcoming.  
       
SATERISK 
 
SATERISK (SATEllite positioning RISKs) is a Finnish research project, which aims at a situation where 
laws on positioning and tracking will not prevent the use of so-called m2m (machine to machine) tracking 
devices across state and union borders.  
The project aims to bring new, international level know-how to the European security field. The project 
will also create new methods and development paths for positioning and tracking systems. The widely used 
US-based GPS (Global Positioning System) and Russian based GLOSNASS (Globalnaja 
navigatsionnaja sputnikovaja sistema) satellite positioning systems will soon get an EU counterpart and 
rival from the Galileo [1]. While most of the satellites are still on the ground, it is important that any 
problems and possibilities related to the new system can be charted. The SATERISK project also aims to 
offer technological solutions to issues that rise while the project is ongoing.  
SATERISK is a joint research project of universities, public organizations and private companies with 
S 
regard to positioning, navigation and tracking systems on the whole tracking value chain, as shown in Figure 
1. The aim of the project is to evaluate risks and the technical and legislative needs for positioning and 
tracking here and now, as well as in the future. However, this paper is a technical one and therefore the 
legislation part is reduced. Technical issues are mainly studied by Laurea University of Applied Sciences and 
they are covering, for example, security, fail resistance and high usability. Despite confirmed intentional 
signal interference cases in tracking have been really rare, there have been some events, where usage of 
jamming devices have been documented.  
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Figure 1, Project sectors 
 
SIGNAL INTERFERENCE 
 
Tracking devices can be interfered in several ways and each of them has their own counter measures. GPS 
(like any other satellite navigation system) frequencies are commonly known and therefore easily disturbed. 
Similarly, tracking device transmissions are as easily stopped by causing noise to GSM and 3G frequency. 
More sophisticated way to interrupt tracking transmission is to use a fake base station, when no other signals 
are disturbed. This makes interference detection much more challenging.  
Another way to nullify tracking system is to use fake satellites (so called pseudo-satellites or pseudolites). 
Instead of jamming, pseudolites imitate satellite signal. Corrupted satellite data causes wrong positioning for 
tracking devices. 
One, theoretical way to prevent tracking is to use electromagnetic pulse (EMP) device. EMP devices are 
expensive and developed for military use. There are no reports about using any EMP device to disrupt civil 
tracking systems.   
Naturally all interference is not intentional. Other electrical equipment could cause errors especially for 
inadequately shielded devices. This problem is easily avoidable by using better shielding and components. 
Therefore unintentional interference is not handled in this document.  
Targets and reasons for interference vary a lot. Although SATERISK project is mostly focused on 
reliability of tracking devices on motor vehicles, results of the project are usable in other environments, too. 
For example, in aviation satellite positioning is gaining ground from traditional radio positioning and even 
radar. Satellite positioning is used to reduce distances between airplanes caused by the slowness of radar. So, 
satellite positioning will reduce costs and improve efficiency, especially in approach and landing [2]. Another 
special case is plan to use positioning to road toll and taxation systems. Positioning-based road toll systems 
have been under development by several private companies and one advantage in this system is that road 
tolls accumulate with driven kilometres. Finnish ministry of transportation and communications has also 
preliminary plans to bill car insurance and car taxes by driven kilometres [3]. This scenario still has some 
issues to be solved, where false positioning is one of them. These scenarios about aviation and road tolls are 
not represented any further in this document.  
 
TECHNICAL ASPECTS 
 
In October 2007, there was an attempted robbery of cash truck near the Finnish city of Turku. The police 
took 11 men into custody, all of them allegedly members of an international gang. The robbers were 
equipped with assault rifles, explosives, bullet-proof vests, masks and a jamming device capable of jamming 
GSM phones, GPS devices and also TETRA phones on very limited range [4]. So, there really is a need to 
know if your assets are a target of intentional electromagnetic interferences (IEMI) and jamming [5-7]. 
Small, 5 meter radius GPS/GSM jammers are easily buyable and prizes start from 50 € [8]. 
The technical approach on the SATERISK project considers e.g. authentication, jamming detection and 
necessary encryption. On some occasions it is necessary to use strong encryption to hide position from public 
for own protection (e.g. money transports) especially if network operators are not trusted, while in other 
circumstances it is vital to get authenticity of position [data protection vs. data authentication] (e.g. in 
aviation).  
International co-operation is needed between authorities to create tracking transmission standards with 
necessary encryption. Standards are needed when changing encrypted position information abroad. Trust 
management will play an essential role in these exercises.  
One of the main technical tasks is to provide information about intentional and accidental interference of 
the tracking signal. This information will help to provide better tracking and positioning devices. It also 
helps to find counter measures for interference.  
 
DETECTION 
 
 In some occasions, it is difficult to separate intentional and unintentional interference from each other, for 
example, when a tracking device enters a tunnel or a parking lot. If interference is caused by natural causes, 
there is not much to do for it. Only possible counteraction is to log these locations to tracker and later the 
tracking administrator may approve these positions as “clarified” positioning error areas.   
On the other hand, if satellite signal is lost suddenly, especially in open environment, it is most likely 
caused by intentional jamming. Intentional jamming is relatively easy to detect, if data about natural 
interference positions is available, but otherwise it is close to lucky guess to separate them.  
Frequency jamming is not the best way to interfere tracking signal. Using pseudolites instead of jammers 
may mislead tracking personnel much easier [9]. Pseudolites can be modified from GPS transceivers, but the 
better ones are built entirely for creating fraud satellite signal. Nowadays, some tracking devices, especially 
in aviation, can identify pseudolites and ignore their signals. However, interfering devices are getting better 
all the time, and better algorithms and countermeasures are needed for detecting them.  
Jamming of GSM signal is relatively easy to spot, because of the wide coverage of signal. If the GSM 
signal is interrupted, the reason is a broken mobile device, a base station failure or intentional jamming. In 
crowded areas, base stations usually cover part of each other’s area and therefore lose of signal most likely is 
prove of jamming.  
While detection of GSM jamming is one of the easiest to spot, the usage of a fake base station is one of the 
hardest. Fake base stations capture all signals of mobile phones, speech, SMS and data, and the user of a fake 
base station may decide if the signal is passed through, decoded and opened, interfered or even changed and 
then forwarded. Every base station has its own unique identification, so called cell ID. If cell ID codes are 
known and stored in tracking devices local database, the device can compare current cell ID with cell IDs of 
current tracking area. This will need a more sophisticated tracking device, because connection to the server is 
not certain in GSM interference situations.  
 COUNTER MEASURES 
 
The most important feature in tracking devices is reliability in all environments [10]. Therefore, 
countermeasures for interference have to be found and tested. The most important counteraction to 
1interference is an immediate alarm to the local unit. Especially, with regard to transportation of valuable 
goods it is vital to get alarm to target unit. Next alarm information should be sent to the backup units.  
To prevent unwanted incidents, it is very important that the information provided by the tracking system 
will be very near to real time. The priority of security system should be to prevent incidents and crimes, not 
to help their investigation afterwards.  
Some standard counteractions for interference can be decided, but they still need to be tested beforehand. 
If tracking device transmissions are interrupted, the device should start to work as a logger. Recorded data 
will be sent to server, when connection is enabled again. Possibility to use alternative communication 
methods have to be researched. Alternative methods could be TETRA phone, wlan or another similar 
wireless solution. 
Pseudolites have to be recognized and ignored. Best knowledge about pseudo-satellites is probably in 
NASA (for example because of Mars navigation) and in aviation industry, where the risks are the biggest. 
However, exact information about pseudo-satellites is likely confidential, because of obvious security issues.  
If the satellite signal is jammed, alternative ways to locate tracking device have to be found. One possible 
solution is to use GSM base station positioning. This will give quite good estimate about position, until 
satellite connection is re-established. In aviation, there always needs to be radar or radio positioning as a 
backup system, especially, when flying in instrumental meteorological condition (IMC).  
If both, satellite information and device transmission systems are jammed; there basically is no way to get 
position information. Then tracking device should go to passive mode and run periodical tests until 
connections are enabled again.  
 
FUTURE WORK AND FINAL WORDS  
 
As stated earlier in the paper, the SATERISK project has just lately begun and there is lots of research 
work to be done. Although SATERISK gets some funding from the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology 
and Innovation (TEKES), it is a relatively small player in the field of positioning. The main goal of the 
project is to improve knowledge of the possible risks regard to positioning and tracking. This knowledge will 
point out new features needed with regard to tracking devices and background systems. In the future these 
features need to be tested as a part of the project. The SATERISK project needs to find balance between 
security and usability of tracking as a security device. After all, users themselves are one of the main risks 
with regard to technical system and therefore also user habits need to be charted.  
Possible changes to international legislation and regulations need lots of work, but it is better to leave these 
questions for the professionals of that topic. The juridical part of the project will be researched in University 
of Lapland. Communication security has to be improved, but that is likely made with already existing 
solutions.  
In general, the SATERISK project is trying to look into the future by finding forthcoming scenarios of the 
risks and benefits. Reliability, error recovery and avoidance of human err are challenging goals, but they still 
are worth trying. 
Positioning and tracking systems do not automatically decrease risks, but can actually create them and 
therefore a risk assessment is needed before using them. When looking at the history of ICT, today’s 
solutions have often turned out to be tomorrow’s problems. Is this applicable and/or avoidable regarding 
Galileo? 
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Abstract: - European integration has increased transport of the illegal goods and criminals. Therefore 
transmitting tracking and other status information between nations and different organizations should become 
every day business. The goal of the paper is to find possible bottle necks in international co-operation between 
authorities  and  to  find  possible  solutions  for  them.  Following  area  can  be  considered  as  a  part  of  the  
SATERISK project [1] that aims at a situation where laws on positioning and tracking and the financial risks 
posed by their usage will not prevent the use of machine-to-machine (m2m) tracking across state and union 
borders. The target of the paper is to present administrative and technical solutions to improve multi-
organizational tracking solutions. Namely, make it possible to create timely situational picture in joint in 
multinational and inter agency operations. This paper will provide guidance for preparing appropriate plans 
and doctrine proposals for joint operations and training. Also, technical solutions and bottlenecks are briefly 
covered in this paper. 
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1   Introduction  
In the past decade, tracking have become essential 
and valuable tool for authorities to prevent and 
examine crimes [2].  At the same time, criminal 
nature and organized crime have internationalized, 
mostly due to European integration. The change has 
been rabid and therefore law enforcement authorities 
(LEA) have failed to create protocols and procedures 
to deal international tracking issues. This paper 
addresses the problems of LEA with regard to cross-
border operations and explains how they differ from 
other operations. It focuses on the operational level 
of action and addresses issues across the range of 
LEA operations. Its goal is to reveal the need for 
technical help and doctrinal guidance focused on 
tasks on or over borders. It examines the special 
considerations required when conducting operations 
in or over the complex modern border environment. 
Many  of  these  problems  are  also  present  in  other  
than nation state borders, but also in other 
governmental borders. 
   It is always more efficient to prevent than to repair 
damages [3]. Unfortunately, preventing is even more 
difficult than crisis management, due to information- 
and time criticalness. Currently, the Geographical 
Information System (GIS) is mostly used for 
analyzing thing after they had happened or trying to 
make logistics more efficient, but not for preventing 
unwanted thing from happening. 
   The military has got used to utilize GIS-systems. 
Also, some LEA-authorities are good at this, but the 
trouble lies on the borders, being it a nation-state or 
juridical border.  
   The European Council held a special meeting on 
15 and 16 October 1999 in Tampere on the creation 
of  an  area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice  in  the  
European Union. The meeting called for joint 
investigation teams to be set up without delay with a 
view to combating trafficking in drugs and human 
beings, as well as terrorism. In the year 2005 and 
2006, there were only two join investigation groups 
[4].  And these were investigation teams, trying to 
find out what happened, although in the long run 
that will also help in prevention. 
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2    Administrative Challenges 
When  something  illegal  has  happened,  it  is  
mandatory for the LEA-authorities to act and failing 
to act may result legal actions. But failing to get or 
share the information from or with the partners is in 
many cases a volunteer action, although the 
information would prevent something unwanted. 
Also, sharing the information is often a complicated 
legal issue. Therefore in many cases, not sharing the 
information is much easier and safer choice for the 
officers’ own well being. 
   Today, LEA agencies are using more tracking 
technology than ever before. Early systems were 
point to point systems, where the surveillance team 
was receiving the information through point to point 
radio communication. Nowadays, systems are 
running more on network (GSM&TCP/IP) based, 
and they can send and receive the information 
basically anywhere. These days, technical tracking is 
used in smaller and smaller cases. 
   Many cross-border joint ventures are targeted at 
some big incidents, although smaller separate cases 
together  are  creating  the  biggest  flow.   That  means  
that  all  the  cases  cannot  go  through  the  same  
hierarchical command system, because there are too 
much of cases. Boarders are creating delay for LEA 
as shown in Fig. 1, and thereupon a crime preventing 
work will often change into an investigating one. 
   Border  is  a  part  that  forms  the  outer  edge  of  
something [6]. It is a very thin line, and if LEA 
officers  want  to  be  successful,  they  need  a  lot  of  
information about both sides of the border. The big 
question is how to overcome those problems 
described in Fig. 1.  
   The exchange of information with people from 
other organizations during crisis situations is often 
done informally. These contacts are not 
institutionalized, but are established on a personal 
basis. Information is shared more easily with people 
that one knows and trusts. [7] But could it be 
generally accepted that real time information sharing 
in law enforcement between parties is based on 
personal contacts? Unfortunately, in many cases this 
is the only way to change metadata about the 
properties and status of the target.  If the information 
Fig. 1.   Informal flow on boarder [5] 
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exchange is based completely on personal contacts, 
it is clear that technology can create only limited 
help. Another bad thing is that in the same time you 
get to be very dependant of key persons. 
Absenteeism or loss of a key individual who cannot 
be  readily  replaced  should  not  be  a  threat  to  public  
safety. 
   In the EU-level, LEA organizations are changing 
information. Europol is the European Law 
Enforcement Organization which aims at improving 
the effectiveness and co-operation of the competent 
authorities in the Member States in preventing and 
combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and 
other serious forms of international organized crime. 
Europol’s task is to handle criminal intelligence. [8] 
Europol works mainly on a political level, because at 
the operational level the pursuit of Europol is simply 
too slow. Therefore, some principles agreed 
beforehand are needed. Currently, the change of 
information LEA organizations helps just in the case 
of investigation or in statistics, but not at the 
operational level. 
3    Auto Release for Doctrines 
There are hundreds of tracking operations going on 
in Europe every moment. They are carried out 
within small proprietary teams. The teams know 
where the contraband comes, and where it is going. 
They have the big picture how to investigate, but 
they don't have the real-time big picture how to 
prevent. This leads to inefficiency. 
   In traditional organizations, knowledge tends to 
flow along organizational lines, from the top to the 
down. The knowledge might be created in lower 
parts of the organization, but for spreading out, it 
usually must first go to the top, and only from there 
it can spread. This pattern seldom results in making 
knowledge available after a timely fashion and 
where it is needed most. Also, dependency of certain 
employees may cause vulnerabilities to information 
flow.  
   Preventing crimes is very time critical business, 
and law enforcement authorities are usually very 
traditional and hierarchical organizations. This 
seems to be a trouble combination, although a long 
tradition also has good points of view. The time 
criticality has forced to created shortcuts for the 
normal operational information passing most of the 
hierarchy. In most cases, information is send and 
used in timely manner. Information can flow across 
organizational lines, reaching the right people who 
can use it in such a way that best serves the goal of 
the organization in question. 
   But if the case is such as not repeating itself 
constantly, e.g. a case dealing with a boarder that 
you don't cross every day, you might end up in 
situation, that you don't have shortcuts anymore. 
Then the information will start to go up and down 
the ladders of hierarchy and the moment is lost. 
   A doctrine is defined as a principle of law 
established through past decisions, a statement of 
fundamental government policy especially in 
international relations or a military principle or set 
of strategies [9]. The normal way of LEA to go is to 
create doctrines. A doctrine will give you advice 
how to proceed in any given situation. In any 
organization there are lot of doctrines, the problem is 
to  remember  of  find  them.  Now  people  are  asking  
advice from their superiors and consuming precision 
time as in the picture. 
   Our answer is to combine tracking systems and 
situational awareness systems with doctrine 
libraries. To successfully execute this, we need a lot 
more  information  from  the  target  than  just  the  
position.   We  need  real  time  status  and  profile  
information to combine the threat to right doctrine. 
Unfortunately, many systems are only producing the 
positioning; there is no profile or status information 
in the message. This situation must be changed. 
4.    Technical Challenge 
Tracking applications have usually been 
organizational or national, although some 
commercial devices are nowadays more widely in 
use. Many of the tracking solution providers offer 
integrated systems, where tracking devices and 
mapping software are combined. Traditionally these 
systems are designed to be standalone services with 
no proper way to communicate with other mapping 
systems. If some interface and protocol exist, 
possibility to send properties and status information; 
so called metadata, is still missing. Differences in 
devices, protocols and background systems have 
caused problems for international co-operation, 
simply because of lack of the commonly agreed 
interfaces.  
   Although standardization of the mapping software 
and transmission protocols is not necessary, some 
common translation to pass information is needed. 
Exchange of information should be automated 
between computers. This information flow should be 
based to organizational doctrine libraries, created 
beforehand.  
   A special conference or workshop for technical 
specialists is thereby needed. Workshop should be 
organized by a European joint organization, such as 
Europol or Frontex; EU’s agency for external border 
security [10]. This would give weight for decisions 
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and also reduce financial arguments.  When building 
up multinational tracking data exchange system, 
costs  are  small  when  compared  to  benefits  of  
international co-operation of authorities.  
   Main goal for the technical meeting is to find 
suitable way to share tracking information abroad 
with no delays. Certain protocols and operation 
procedures are needed. Possibility to adopt already 
existing methods, e.g. from military, should be 
considered. Currently the National Marine 
Electronics Association (NMEA) protocol is used in 
some  international  sharing.  [11]  But  for  real  time  
surveillance it is not sufficient; because NMEA does 
not provide possibility to send metadata.  
   Transmission protocol is not the only issue in 
multinational tracking network. Also, the applied 
network topology has to be decided. One possible 
topology is presented in Fig. 2. Today, criminals 
applies more and more technology [12]. So, all data 
transfer is encrypted and protected with virtual 
private network (VPN). A question to sort out is that 
should the tracking information be encrypted also 
inside private network? If so, the easiest way is to 
use common public and private key solution. All the 
public keys should be stored into the one server 
connectible in the private network. 
   When connection to the other LEA authority is 
needed, transmitting server acquires needed public 
keys from dedicated server, encrypts and sends 
messages to the receiver. When the receiving server 
gets new encrypted message, it automatically 
decrypts data (if transmitting server is in “allowed” 
list)  and  ask  permission  to  create  new target  to  the  
map, if it does not already exist. If data transmission 
is nearly on daily basis, auto-permission procedure 
should be used. 
   Second main topic for international consortium is 
to find reliable ways to change additional 
information during the tracking. This, so called 
metadata contains necessary information about 
target and therefore should be transmitted also to the 
foreign authorities. Metadata is information about 
target, such as for example details about target 
vehicle, possible risks of the target (target being. 
armed?) and preferred actions against target. Like 
always in such operations, all data should be 
encrypted. All metadata should be sent among 
spatial information. 
5.   Future Work and Final Words 
Today, many of the suggested solutions in our paper 
exist only on the drawing board. Therefore they need 
lots of testing and international cooperation. 
Technical and administrational meetings are 
required to build up international (or at least EU-
wide) network system to handle tracking 
information flow. Some already existing working 
principles can be adopted e.g. from military, and 
therefore the usage of existing know-how should be 
considered. Especially, a common language for the 
metadata, such as the military standard MIL-STD 
2525 in military side, should make it possible to 
apply doctrine libraries. Because of different 
legislation, even EU Member States must have little 
different doctrine libraries until united EU 
Fig. 2. Network topology 
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legislation is achieved. However, the main principles 
and the language should be the same. 
   Building up a new multinational tracking 
information system needs lots of political, 
administrational and technical decisions. It also 
needs lots of effort and time. Many bottlenecks and 
possible problems still need to be solved. However, 
co-operation is the key element for better results. 
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Abstract: - European integration has increased the transport of illegal goods and other criminal activity. 
Therefore the transmitting of tracking and other status information between nations and different organizations 
should become an everyday business. The goal of this paper is to find possible bottle necks in international 
cooperation between authorities and to find possible solutions for them. The following area can be considered 
as a part of the Finnish SATERISK research project that aims for a situation where laws on positioning and 
tracking and the financial risks posed by their usage will not prevent the use of m2m tracking across state and 
union borders. The target of the paper is to present administrative and technical solutions to improve multi-
organizational tracking solutions. Namely, the goal is to make it possible to create a timely situational picture 
in joint multinational and interagency operations. This paper will provide guidance for preparing appropriate 
plans and doctrine proposals for joint operations and training. Also technical solutions and bottlenecks are 
briefly covered in this paper.   
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1   Introduction  
In the past decade, tracking has become an essential 
and valuable tool for authorities to prevent and 
investigate crimes [1].  At the same time, criminal 
nature and organized crime have internationalized, 
mostly due to European integration. Within the last 
decade, criminals have also become more 
technically oriented. Some countermeasures for 
tracking applications have been found from the 
hands of the criminals [2], and therefore 
international cooperation between officials becomes 
even more vital.  
The change has been rabid and therefore law 
enforcement authorities (LEA) have failed to create 
protocols and procedures to deal with international 
tracking issues. This paper addresses the problems 
of LEA with regard to cross-border operations and 
explains how they differ from other operations. It 
focuses on the operational level of action and 
addresses issues across the range of LEA operations. 
Its goal is to reveal the need for technical help and 
doctrinal guidance focused on tasks on or over 
borders. It examines the special considerations 
required when conducting operations in or over the 
complex modern border environment. Many of these 
problems are also present in non-national or state 
borders, but also in other governmental borders. 
It  is  always  more  efficient  to  prevent  than  to  
repair damages [3]. Unfortunately, preventing is 
even more difficult than crisis management, due to 
information and time criticality [4]. Currently, the 
Geographical Information System (GIS) is mostly 
used for analyzing situations after they have 
happened or trying to make logistics more efficient, 
but not for preventing unwanted events from 
happening. 
The military has become accustomed to utilizing 
GIS.  Also,  some  LEA  are  good  at  this,  but  the  
trouble remains on the borders, be it a nation-state or 
juridical border. The European Council held a 
special meeting on 15 and 16 October 1999 in  
Tampere on the creation of an area of freedom, 
security and justice in the European Union. The 
meeting called for joint investigation teams to be set 
up without delay with a view to combat the  
trafficking in drugs and human beings, as well as 
terrorism. In 2005 and 2006, there were only two 
joint investigation groups [5]. These were post-event 
investigation teams, trying to find out what 
happened, although in the long run that will also 
help with prevention. 
 
 
 
2   SATERISK Project 
SATERISK  (SATEllite  positioning  RISKs)  is  a  
Finnish research project, which aims at a situation 
where laws on positioning and tracking will allow 
the use of so-called m2m (machine to machine) 
tracking devices across state and union borders. [6] 
The project aims to bring new know-how on an 
international level to the European security field. 
The project will also create new methods and 
development paths for positioning and tracking 
systems. The widely used US-based GPS (Global 
Positioning System) and Russian-based GLOSNASS 
(Globalnaja navigatsionnaja sputnikovaja sistema) 
satellite positioning systems will soon get an EU 
counterpart and rival from Galileo [7]. While most 
of the satellites are still on the ground, it is important 
that any problems and possibilities related to the 
new  system  are  charted.  The  SATERISK  project  
also  aims  to  offer  technological  solutions  to  issues  
that arise while the project is ongoing.  
SATERISK  is  a  joint  research  project  of  
universities, public organizations and private 
companies with regard to positioning, navigation 
and tracking systems on the whole tracking value 
chain,  as  shown in Fig.  1.  The aim of  the project  is  
to evaluate risks and the technical and legislative 
needs for positioning and tracking here and now, as 
well as in the future. This paper is mostly focused on 
the international co-operability. Technical issues are 
mainly studied by Laurea University of Applied 
Sciences,  for  example,  security  [8],  fail  resistance  
and high usability. A concept of satellite tracking 
system is shown in Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 1   Sectors of SATERISK project 
 
 
3   Administrative challenges 
When  something  illegal  has  happened,  it  is  
mandatory for the LEA to act, and failing to act may 
result in legal actions. Failing to obtain or share the 
information from or with the partners, however, is in 
many cases a volunteer action, although the 
information could prevent something unwanted. 
Also, sharing the information is often a complicated 
legal issue. Therefore in many cases, not sharing the 
information is a much easier and safer choice for the 
officers’ own well being. 
Today, LEA are using more tracking technology 
than ever before. Early systems were point-to-point 
systems, where the surveillance team was receiving 
the information through point-to-point radio 
communication. Nowadays, more systems are 
network-based (GSM & TCP/IP), and users can send 
and receive the information basically anywhere. 
These days, technical tracking is used in fewer and 
fewer cases. 
Many cross-border joint ventures are targeted at 
some big incidents, although smaller separate cases 
together  are  creating  the  biggest  flow.   That  means  
that  all  the  cases  cannot  go  through  the  same  
hierarchical command system, because there are too 
many cases. Borders often create delays for LEA as 
shown  in  figures  1-4,  and  therefore  a  crime  
preventing work will often change into an 
investigation. 
In  Fig.  3  there  is  a  normal  real-time  tracking  
situation, where the local LEA is getting the target’s 
position in near real-time, only with a few seconds 
delay. 
Fig.  4  presents  the point  when the LEA starts  to  
be worried that the target might go across the border, 
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Fig. 2   Concept of satellite tracking system 
but the tracking is still near real-time. A border is a 
very thin line, and if LEA officers want to be 
successful, they need timely information about both 
sides of the border.  Border guards are very seldom 
responsible for tracking, so in many cases they do 
not have the information. 
After  the  target  crosses  the  border  (Fig.  5),  the  
trouble starts. The target’s timeline is still straight-
forward,  but  now  the  LEA  starts  to  use  time  in  
discussions with superiors to find out how to 
proceed  in  the  new  situation.   There  is  still  no  
information on the border or on the other side. 
The exchange of information with people from 
other organizations during crisis situations is often 
done informally. These contacts are not 
institutionalized, but are established on a personal 
 
Fig. 3   Flow of information and movement of target – Start situation [9] 
 
 
 
Fig. 4    Flow of information and movement of target – Point of caution [9] 
basis. Information is shared more easily with people 
that one knows and trusts [10]. Is it accepteable that 
real-time information sharing in law enforcement 
between parties is based on personal contacts? 
Nowadays it is commonly the only way to change 
metadata about the properties and status of the 
target.  If the information exchange is based 
completely on personal contacts, it is clear that 
technology can create only limited help. Another 
disadvantage is dependency of the key persons. 
Absenteeism or loss of a key individual who cannot 
be  readily  replaced  should  not  be  a  threat  to  public  
safety. 
The real-time tracking might be still on, but the 
 
 
Fig. 5   Flow of information and movement of target –  Bureaucratic challenge [9] 
 
 
 
Fig. 6    Flow of information and movement of target – Information is lagging [9] 
target is over the border and the information stays on 
the wrong side of the border as seen in Fig. 6. 
Tracking information is often most critically needed 
by LEA near the target. In this scenario is not there 
where it is needed. 
At the EU-level, LEA organizations are 
exchanging information. “EUROPOL is the 
European Law Enforcement Organization which 
aims at improving the effectiveness and co-operation 
of the competent authorities in the Member States in 
preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug 
trafficking and other serious forms of international 
organized crime.” EUROPOL’s task is to handle 
criminal intelligence. [11] EUROPOL works mainly 
on a political level because at the operational level 
the pursuit of Europol is simply too slow. Therefore, 
some principles agreed to beforehand are needed. 
Currently, the change of information between LEA 
organizations helps just in the case of investigation 
or in statistics, but not at the operational level. 
There are hundreds of tracking operations going 
on in Europe at every moment. Operations are done 
with small proprietary teams. The teams know 
where the contraband comes from and where it is 
going, and so they have the big picture about the 
situation. This is essential for investigation purposes, 
but it doesn’t provide the real-time big picture 
required to prevent incidents. This leads to 
inefficiencies and ineffectiveness. Fig. 7 presents the 
worst case scenario, where as the situation 
progresses, the possibility to act is lost. 
 
 
 
4   Auto Release for Doctrines 
In traditional organizations, knowledge tends to flow 
along organizational lines, from the top to bottom. 
The knowledge might be created in lower parts of 
the organization, but for spreading horizontally, it 
usually must first go to the top, and only from there 
can it spread. This pattern seldom results in making 
knowledge available in a timely fashion and in the 
places where it is needed most. Also, dependency on 
certain employees may cause vulnerabilities to 
information flow. 
Preventing crimes is a very time-critical business, 
and law enforcement authorities are usually very 
traditional and hierarchical organizations. This 
seems to be a  troublesome combination,  although a 
long tradition also provides some positive aspects. 
The time-criticality has forced officers to create 
shortcuts for the normal operational information, 
bypassing most of the hierarchy. In most cases, 
information sent in this way is received and used in 
a timely manner. Information can flow across 
organizational lines, reaching the right people who 
can use it in such a way that best serves the goal of 
the organization in question. 
However, if the situation is not very common, 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7    Flow of information and movement of target –  Lost possibility to react [9] 
e.g. a case dealing with a border that you do not 
cross every day, you might end up in a situation 
where you do not have shortcuts anymore. Then the 
information will start to go up and down the ladders 
of hierarchy, and the opportunity for prevention is 
lost. 
A doctrine is defined as a principle of law 
established through past decisions, a statement of 
fundamental government policy especially in 
international relations or a military principle or set 
of strategies [12]. LEA frequently create doctrines to 
guide their operations. A doctrine will give you 
advice on how to proceed in any given situation. In 
any given organization there are lot of doctrines, and 
the problem is to remember how and where to find 
them.  This same type of problem is described in the 
context of facility management in [13]. The answer 
is  also  the  same:  the  administrator  must  create  
control rules. 
Our  answer  is  to  combine  tracking  systems  
(shown in Fig. 8) and situational awareness systems 
with doctrine libraries. To successfully do this we 
need a lot more information from the target than just 
the position.  We need real-time status and profile 
information to match the threat to the right doctrine. 
Unfortunately, many systems are only producing the 
positioning information; there is no profile or status 
information in the message. This must be changed. 
In the private sector, companies know that the more 
information they have about customers, the easier it 
is to get more information. Customer information is 
the key to good customer support systems [14]. In 
this LEA tracking context it means that the more 
information you have about the target in the tracking 
messages, the better are the chances to succeed. 
 
 
 
5   Technical Challenge 
Tracking applications have usually been developed 
by organizations or national agencies, although some 
commercial devices are nowadays more widely in 
use. Many of the tracking solution providers offer 
integrated systems, where tracking devices and 
mapping software are combined. Traditionally these 
systems are designed to be standalone services with 
no built-in way to communicate with other mapping 
systems.  If  some  interface  and  protocol  exists,  the  
possibility to send properties and status information, 
so-called metadata, is still missing. Differences 
between devices, protocols and background systems 
have caused problems for international cooperation, 
simply due to lack of commonly agreed interfaces. 
The majority of tracking devices use GSM or a 
similar method of transmission [8]. Especially 
commercially available devices have in some cases 
been tailored to the certain environment. Because 
users of the tracking devices cannot be sure about 
networks in a foreign country (especially in the 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8     Faster information flow with doctrine libraries 
future), basic SMS capability is needed as a backup 
transmission method. Although standardization of 
the mapping software and transmission protocols is 
not necessary, some common translation to pass 
information is needed. Exchange of information 
should be automated between computers. This 
information flow should be based to organizational 
doctrine libraries, created beforehand.  
Therefore, a conference or workshop for 
technical specialists is needed. Workshop should be 
organized by a European joint organization, like 
EUROPOL  or  FRONTEX,  the  EU’s  agency  for  
external border security [15]. This would give 
weight for decisions and also reduce financial 
limitations. When building up a multinational 
tracking data exchange system, costs are small when 
compared to benefits of international cooperation of 
authorities. 
Shared data should be considered critical 
information, and therefore appropriate data 
protection is required. More and more information 
and communications have become network-based, 
and accordingly the number of cyber-security 
incidents has increased. Although some nations have 
already established critical information 
infrastructure protection (CIIP) laws [16], European-
level legislation is still missing. 
When an information infrastructure is installed 
and all functions tested, the system should be tested 
against external and also internal cyber attacks to 
find possible vulnerabilities. Protection against 
external attacks and alternative routing with 
different IP addresses should be tested to provide 
necessary reliability for the system. Ref. [17] is one 
useful aid for planning security tests. 
The main goal for the technical meeting would be 
to find a suitable way to share tracking information 
abroad with no delays. Certain protocols and 
operational procedures are needed. The possibility to 
adopt already existing methods, for example from 
military organizations, should be considered. 
Currently the National Marine Electronics 
Association (NMEA) protocol is used in some 
international situations, but for real-time 
surveillance it is not sufficient. For example, the 
NMEA protocol does not provide the possibility to 
send metadata. [18] 
The lack of a transmission protocol is not the 
only issue in developing a multinational tracking 
network. A network topology also has to be agreed 
upon. One possible network topology is presented in 
Fig. 9. All data transfer is encrypted and protected 
with a virtual private network (VPN), but should 
tracking information also be encrypted inside a 
private  network?  If  so,  the  easiest  way  is  to  use  a  
common public- and private-key solution. All the 
public keys should be stored in one server 
connectible via the private network. 
When a connection to another LEA authority is 
needed, the transmitting server acquires needed 
public keys from a dedicated server, and then 
encrypts and sends messages to the receiver. When 
the receiving server gets a new encrypted message, it 
automatically decrypts the data (if the transmitting 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9   Network topology 
server is in the “allowed” list) and asks permission 
to create a new target to the map, if it does not 
already exist. If data transmission is on a nearly 
daily basis, auto-permission should be used.  
The second main topic for this international 
consortium is to find reliable ways to exchange 
additional information during tracking. This so-
called metadata contains necessary information 
about the target and therefore should also be 
transmitted to the foreign authorities. Metadata can 
include details about the target vehicle, possible 
risks of the target (e.g. armed) and preferred actions 
against the target. Like always, all data should be 
encrypted. All metadata should be sent along with 
the spatial information. 
 
 
 
5   Future Work and Final Words 
Many of the suggested solutions are now only on the 
drawing board, and therefore they need a great deal 
of testing and international cooperation. Technical 
and administrative meetings are required to build up 
an international (or at least EU-wide) network 
system to handle tracking information flow. Some 
currently functioning principles can be adopted, for 
example from military organizations, and usage of 
this existing know-how should be carefully 
considered. A common language for the metadata, 
like military standard MIL-STD 2525 [19], should 
make it possible to use doctrine libraries. Because of 
differences in legislation between countries, slightly 
different doctrine libraries may be needed until 
united  EU  legislation  can  be  adopted.  In  any  case,  
the main principles and the language should be the 
same.  
Building up new multinational tracking 
information system requires many political, 
administrative and technical decisions, which will 
require lots of effort and time. Many bottlenecks and 
possible problems still need to be solved. 
Cooperation is the key for better results. The 
criminals are getting more international every day, 
and law enforcement should do the same 
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